



WCHSMUN2019
BACKGROUND GUIDE

Letter From the Chair

Hello delegates,

I, on behalf of all the chairs, welcome you to *WCHSMUN 2019*, and in particular the *Korea 2025* specialized assembly! I hope that you are as excited to tackle such a nuanced and pertinent situation as we are. As chairs for this committee, we aim to provide a fun, energetic, and thoughtful committee along with a valuable learning experience. I hope that this background guide will serve as invaluable research and guidance for successful debate, and inspire you to conduct your own further research.

WCHSMUN 2019 will be my third year on staff, and my second as a head chair. I have been involved heavily with crisis committees in the past, so be prepared to engage with some crisis elements! As a delegate, I have attended international-level conferences in Montreal and New York; I hope to bring the best of each to your *WCHSMUN* experience. In addition, I am serving as Chief of Operations for this year's conference. If you have any questions about the conference overall, please ask!

I, along with the other chairs, can say that *WCHSMUN* is a truly unique experience in the Calgary MUN circuit. Featuring unorthodox committee ideas, novel uses of procedure, and a whole bunch of crisis, the conference you are attending is an amazing opportunity to gain new understandings of MUN, history, and the world. We hope that you can walk away from this weekend having gained something.

In using this guide, we would like to emphasize the importance of reading your character's biography! This committee will thrive on the lively debate of diverse perspectives, and we have chosen characters with deliberately clashing worldviews. We hope that each delegate, in preparation for this committee, can become semi-experts in the aspects their character finds most important, and contribute their expertise in the summit. Again, the chairs can be vital resources and would love to help you, so please do not hesitate to reach out to us!

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Head Chair, Korea 2025 Specialized Assembly

WCHSMUN 2019

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Introduction

For almost three-quarters of a century, the war between North and South Korea has continued, despite the lack of open hostilities. A roller-coaster of diplomatic history has followed, involving alarming border skirmishes along the lengthy demilitarized zone (DMZ), intense nuclear development and crises, and numerous moments in history where Asia's geopolitical stability was entirely uncertain. As the only current nation-state in the world to remain divided, Korea has developed possibly irreconcilable differences between North and South—different ways of life have emerged in culture, economy, and family.¹ Nevertheless, an end to the war and a Korean reunification is favoured by both sides—not to mention the global community—in restoring regional stability.² In the year 2025, both sides have agreed to hold an international summit, reminiscent of the six-party talks of the past.

Recent Developments

Why 2025? We'd like to provide a plausible justification for all parties to be at these negotiations, as it is important in ensuring the productivity of the committee. We don't want to see delegates storming out, after all. Additionally, some of these details may be relevant in creating solutions and may serve as the basis for some crisis elements throughout the committee. So, how did we get here?

- China, after incredible economic growth for decades, has seen its growth rate reduce to around 1%, producing doubts regarding China's economic power.
- The US, has offered removing tariffs, allowing Huawei to bid for 5G contracts, and scaling down the US-China trade war, on the condition of incorporating China in Korean reunification negotiations.
- China has accepted the offer and is looking to shape Korea into a China-friendly buffer state/economic partner. China also brings the DPRK to the table.
- Russia and Japan have been invited to the summit, in a similar manner as previous six-party talks, in recognition of their historical and geopolitical stakes.

¹ Ramzy, Austin. "What a Korean War Peace Deal Could Mean." *The New York Times*. 26 February 2019. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/world/asia/korea-peace-deal.html>

² "Korean Reunification: High Hopes and Higher Hurdles." *Geopolitical Futures*. 3 May 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/korean-reunification-high-hopes-and-higher-hurdles/>

Topic I: Peace Treaties

The first step for any meaningful progress in this summit is the successful cessation of the Korean War. This is necessary for a couple of reasons: for one, the buildup of arms and foreign militaries makes reunification prospects dubious at best. Additionally, there is a diplomatic element to peace that sets the stage for further negotiation—determining the sovereignty and status of both Koreas is essential in planning a future unified state. When crafting this peace, it is imperative to consider long-term consequences; delegates must understand that their treaties lay the groundwork for the following topic, and can fundamentally change the dynamic of future discussion. Moreover, compromise is *mandated*. Although half-measures often “wholly fail,” cooperation is based on a mutual willingness and trust that has been established through the last eight years. Delegates should remember that in order to be productive in this committee, they should not solely rely on the hard-line positions of the distant past, but should be adaptive and up-to-date in their state’s evolving stance on cooperation.

A Note on Peace Treaties

This summit features a special resolution format not found in conventional UN committees. In writing a peace treaty, delegates are permitted to use assertive language (i.e. “demanding” things as opposed to “urging” them) as the summit does not serve an advisory purpose. Additionally, the use of sub-sections is permitted but not required, in organising similar themes; as such, the Dias would recommend enumeration in the form of 1.0, 1.1 1.9.1, 2.0, etc. However, delegates will not be penalised for using standard UN resolution formatting—these stipulations merely lift some of the restrictions imposed in writing advisory, universal legislation.

In addition, the summit will only produce **one** peace treaty; to pass more would be redundant. Delegates will still draft and negotiate multiple working papers, but they must keep the fact of inevitable mergers in the back of their mind. The Dias will adjust its judging accordingly. Note, also, that some of the considerations a peace agreement will invariably overlap with those of reunification (i.e. military posturing, sovereignty, sanctions, etc). These ideas can be included in working papers of **either** topic, provided that the chair deems them relevant.

Areas of Interest

For any ‘peace treaty’ to actually constitute a peace treaty, it must contain within it a peace-producing clause. That is to say, the current state of war (or armistice) is to be defined and then replaced with a permanent state of peace. In this case, a formal end to the Korean armed conflict is at hand.

For any ‘peace treaty’ to actually be worth its salt, however, it should consider a wider range of elements that hold power over the ultimate viability of the treaty. In the case of North and South Korea, an agreement must be made over the formal designation of borders and the future of the DMZ. The four-kilometre-wide strip traverses the entirety of the peninsula and comprises of terrifying military infrastructure juxtaposed among pristine wilderness.³ In the 2010s, South Korea even invested into semi-autonomous sentry guns like the Super aEgis II—such expensive investments should be addressed when reevaluating the future of the DMZ.⁴ This taps into the broader question of militarism as well; what does a peace treaty mean for the United States military presence in South Korea? Will it require a full withdrawal or reduction of foreign troops? If so, can this peace then be characterized as a North Korean/Chinese ploy against the US? There is, of course, the large possibility that US forces may remain in Korea—after all, military tensions can exist between non-warring states, in India and Pakistan, for example.⁵ If so, does the US get military access to the entirety of the Korean peninsula? Does the potential US military force on China’s border pose an unacceptable threat to the Chinese? The positioning and approach to force is an extremely nuanced and pertinent issue that all parties hold differing perspectives towards. In drafting a peace treaty, delegates must assert limitations and stipulations on force posturing throughout Korea; it is imperative to define these clearly in a way in which states do not feel threatened. However, this aspect need not be exhaustively covered—foreign military posturing bleeds heavily into the second topic of reunification—but military assets directly related to an inter-Korea war or the current DMZ need to be regulated when drafting a peace treaty.

³ Walker, Phillip. “The World’s Most Dangerous Borders.” *Foreign Policy*. 24 June 2011. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/24/the-worlds-most-dangerous-borders/>

⁴ Parkin, Simon. “Killer Robots: The Soldiers That Never Sleep.” *BBC News*. 16 July 2015. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150715-killer-robots-the-soldiers-that-never-sleep>

⁵ Bard, Abby. “The Pros and Cons of a Korean War Peace Treaty.” *National Interest*. 20 August 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/pros-and-cons-korean-war-peace-treaty-29322>

The nuclear elephant in the room should also be addressed. In the past decade, the problem of denuclearization has been the primary cause of deadlock in negotiations between the North and South; Kim Jong-un calls for a peace treaty/lifting of sanctions as a prerequisite for the DPRK's denuclearization, while the US sees the pacification of the DPRK's nuclear programme as necessary to begin peace talks.⁶ This was evident in the deadlock of the 2019 Hanoi Summit.⁷ However, throughout the last decade, North Korea has initiated numerous denuclearization gestures through the dismantlement of test centers and launchpads near Tonchang, Sohae, and Pyongyang.⁸ They have also revealed a willingness to decommission the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.⁹ This evolution of North Korean nuclear policy comes after decades of increasing nuclear escalation—"My nuclear red button is bigger than yours" and "Rocketman" come to mind.¹⁰ In this summit, the underlying presumption exists that North Korea is increasingly willing to discard its nuclear capability, and that China is accelerating this willingness. How this nuclear capability is discarded permanently and irreversibly is another question that the committee must address—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s verification methods have been thoroughly rejected by North Korea in the past.¹¹ As such, the summit should suggest mechanisms for ensuring increased transparency and security as Korean peace moves forward. Indeed, this summit has powers unavailable to the IAEA—transparency of nuclear dismantlement can be decisively ensured within the peace agreement. On the other side, international sanctions on North Korea can also be reevaluated or lifted within the peace agreement, but delegates may choose to address the issue of sanctions in the second topic of Reunification.

⁶ Cronin, Patrick M. "Give Peace With North Korea a Chance, but Remember Plan B." *Foreign Policy*. 14 January 2019. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/14/give-peace-with-north-korea-a-chance-but-remember-plan-b/>

⁷ Diamond, Jeremy. "Takeaways from the Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit." *CNN Politics*. 28 February 2019. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/politics/trump-kim-hanoi-summit-takeaways/index.html>

⁸ Sang-hun, Choe. "North Korea Starts Dismantling Key Missile Facilities, Report Says." *The New York Times*. 23 July 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/world/asia/north-korea-dismantling-missile-facilities.html>

⁹ Samore, Gary. "How Significant is the Dismantlement of Yongbyon?" *38 North*. 11 March 2019. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.38north.org/2019/03/qsamore031119/>

¹⁰ Keneally, Meghan. "From 'Fire and Fury' to 'Rocket Man,' the Various Barbs Traded Between Trump and Kim Jong Un" *ABC News*. 11 June 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://abcnews.go.com/International/fire-fury-rocket-man-barbs-traded-trump-kim/story?id=53634996>

¹¹ "IAEA and DPRK: Chronology of Key Events" *International Atomic Energy Agency*. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/chronology-of-key-events>

The next question is one of sovereignty: how will the new state be structured? With a peace treaty, an inherent level of legitimacy is acknowledged for both Koreas. Indeed, a peace agreement may be interpreted as an acceptance of the two-state solution. This is a viable option in and of itself—both states can be recognized as sovereign before being reunified. However, delegates should understand that their treaty should align with their ambitions in reunification—delegates can set a federalist system; a one country, two-systems model (eg. China and Hong Kong); complete integration; the creation of a Korean Economic Community;¹² or other alternatives. This significance is most clear when considering the notion of reparations and war guilt. Historically, it is rare to see peace treaties completely ‘turn over a new leaf’—recall that the ‘Carthaginian’ peace of the Treaty of Versailles, with its war-guilt clause (Article 231) inciting particular outrage.¹³ As North Korea invaded first in June 1950, South Korean delegates may want to see reparations attributed to the North. Although doing so would pursue historical interests, they might hinder reunification. As such, all delegates at the summit need to come to an agreement over the status of the Korean peninsula, and whether or not to impose reparations or include war guilt clauses.

Bloc Analysis

All parties involved are supportive of Korean peace. As such, the actual differences of opinion between delegates will come down to their perspectives on obstacles. The DPRK and China consistently urge for the lifting of sanctions, while the US and her allies stress denuclearization.¹⁴ In a similar fashion, North Korea, China, and Russia share military concerns regarding the US—military presence, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system are of particular concern.¹⁵ In addition, the involved states are divided by opinions on the role of foreign powers. Although larger powers wish to influence the peace treaty to favour their geostrategic interests, the Korean delegates may wish to keep the treaty strictly related to Korean interests and actions. Delegates should remember that peace requires a definition of the conflict—the telling of this story holds tremendous weight.

¹² Soon-jik, Hong. “Toward Reunification Via Inter-Korean Economic Community.” *Korea.net*. 26 August 2007. Accessed 12 March 2019, from https://web.archive.org/web/20090309011658/http://www.korea.net/news/News/newsView.asp?serial_no=20070824029

¹³ Keynes, John Maynard. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. 1919. Accessed digitally 12 March 2019, from <https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/keynes/pdf%26filename%3Dpeace3.pdf>

¹⁴ Diamond, Jeremy. “Takeaways from the Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit.” *CNN Politics*. 28 February 2019. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/politics/trump-kim-hanoi-summit-takeaways/index.html>

¹⁵ Blanchard, Ben and Martina, Michael. “China Military Criticizes ‘Wrong’ US Moves on Taiwan, South China Sea.” *Reuters*. 16 August, 2017. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-dunford-idUSKCN1AX0EF>

Topic II: Reunification

Following a successful peace treaty between North and South Korea, the question of Korean reunification remains looming. Despite positive aspects of a reunified Korea—notably a bolstered economy, increased access to lucrative resources and cheap labour, and the strengthening of the Korean peninsula against foreign subjugation, among others—delegates must be mindful of the reasons why such a reunification has not already happened. In examining the lengthy history of the peninsula and the longevity of the North Korean regime, it is essential to consider the Kim family governance model and their impact on generations of Korean people, as well as the external forces that have fed into reinforcing this regime’s control and suppression of those who attempt to challenge it. This practice has been extremely effective and abandoning it does not appear to be in the best interest of the Kim family. Striking differences between South and North Korean history and how they contribute to the current political, economic and social situations on both ends are also vital to consider during a debate on the outcomes and reasons for a reunification. The decisions that must be made in re-unifying Korea might seem open-ended and unclear at times, but delegates must be cognizant of the enormous geostrategic, geopolitical, economic, and social implications of their solutions.

A Note on Writing a Reunification Programme

Historically speaking, the reunification of states has never been a simple process, especially between peaceful nations. As such, the ‘resolutions’ that this topic will produce can take multiple forms with a wide variety of purposes. For simplicity, the summit will refer to all of these reunification programmes as simply ‘resolutions.’ Be mindful that these resolutions are **not** UN resolutions and are permitted to use assertive language. They might also declare courses of unilateral action or steps required for reunification. In this topic, the summit will be allowed to pass **3** resolutions.

Areas of Interest

As was seen in the peace process, the devil is in the details. That is to say, vast logistical problems arise. There are so many considerations that delegates will have to decide which are *most* important. A strong delegate will inspire others to recognize the importance of their interests, and collaborate to produce a detailed resolution. In this section, the most prominent questions regarding Korean reunification will be presented.

Political

What will the new government look like? Will the power structures survive reunification? North Korea has historically based its policy decisions on survival; this is simply incompatible with historical examples of reunification. Indeed, North Korea's use of repression and propaganda means that such a loss of control would be catastrophic, resulting in a mass exodus reminiscent of the fall of the Berlin Wall. This raises the question: how can the new state balance the preservation of existing power while also (a) unifying the peninsula and (b) implementing democratic elements? Perhaps the most viable solution is a confederation, wherein both North and South Korea can retain their respective systems. Naturally, North Korea has historically championed this idea. However, a confederation would bring its own challenges: what is the makeup of the federal government? Who runs it? Brand-new executive, legislative, and judicial entities must be created. A timeline needs to be made for democratic elections—if agreed upon. Such reforms could be delegated to sub-committees (perhaps a constitutional assembly) or addressed directly, but need to be considered regardless. Additionally, how will the new state gain worldwide recognition? What regional bodies should it retain, renegotiate, or forget? Military pacts, alliances, and international bodies are of particular concern: will the US still have a military claim to the region? One final aspect is border disputes, with respect to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), notably over the Liancourt rocks and Socotra rock.¹⁶ Whether this be done through a redrawing of borders, or a stronger Korean negotiating position, or some other means is up to you.

¹⁶ Pike, John. "Liancourt Rocks / Takeshima / Dokdo / Tokto." *GlobalSecurity.org*. 24 November 2014. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liancourt.htm>; "China Chafes at Korean Observatory on Reef Island." *The Chosun Ilbo*. 14 September 2006. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20061102190745/http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200609/200609140017.html>

Military

Another pressing concern involves the reunification of the military. Even if confederation allows the continuation of separate political systems, it does not make sense to keep the militaries distinct—there is simply too great a risk for inflamed relations that escalate to war, this time being ‘civil’ in nature. To prevent the reunification from being superficial, a merger of the militaries appears necessary. In order to facilitate this merger, however, both Koreas might need to scale back their militaries to the extent that they do not pose a threat to each other. The demilitarization of the region near the DMZ, the repositioning of troops and defensive structures, the exit of American forces numbering around ~28 000 troops, the removal of North Korean artillery capable of striking Seoul, and the permanent and verifiable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program seem to be necessary.¹⁷ The surrender of all forms of deterrence would likely be unacceptable by most parties. The Koreas might instead agree on creating a joint military command of all forces on the peninsula. Again, demilitarization would still have to be discussed, but not to the extent that both states pose no risk to each other. However, if such a joint command is established, it needs to include numerous safeguards to prevent its exploitation by either Korea. The strength, integrity, and effectiveness of a joint military force seem to rely entirely on the success of the political merger described above. Impartiality is dependent on the creation of a federal identity, sentiment, and structure. Despite this need for safeguards, however, the joint command cannot be overly complex—the 20th century has illustrated numerous examples of individuals exploiting bureaucracy to disastrous consequence.

¹⁷ Bowman, Tom. “Would the US Withdraw Troops From South Korea?” *National Public Radio*. 31 May 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/05/31/615517016/would-the-u-s-withdraw-troops-from-south-korea>

Economic

North Korea's GDP is less than 1% of South Korea's, and its economy is predominantly agrarian, in sharp contrast to the hi-tech leadership of the world's 11th biggest economy, South Korea.¹⁸ Bringing North Korea up to par with South Korea's economic development is going to be a hugely expensive task. Additionally, North Korea has a massive untapped mineral base requiring extraction infrastructure. Vast reserves of zinc, tungsten, magnesite, gold, and graphite will serve as important economic assets after reunification.¹⁹ However, utilizing these resources without Southern exploitation of the North will be imperative to prevent resentment. On the topic of stigma, the South Korean population will have to bear the brunt of developing North Korea; a possible mechanism for this might be a 'Reunification Tax.'²⁰ Foreign aid and investment can be utilized, but care must be taken to not undercut regional sovereignty. As the South Koreans seem to be paying a substantial amount no matter the course of action, making the South Korean population more amenable to spending is extremely important. Furthermore, the question of international sanctions should be addressed. North Korea's numerous sanctions have limited its economy; does it make sense for reunification to release them from international punishment? On the other hand, if North Korea is willing to dismantle its nuclear program and open its doors, the sanctions will have fulfilled their original purpose. Finally, transportation ought to be addressed. Recent developments in 2013 have modernized most of North Korea's rail system into dual-gauge systems, allowing Russian, Chinese, and Korean trains to operate.²¹ However, North Korea's air transport sector is heavily underdeveloped, stemming from international sanctions and Kim Jong-il's personal fear of flying.²² Thus, the issues regarding transportation within a unified Korean state are the lack of air infrastructure in North Korea, as well as the re-opening of the DMZ to cross-border travel. The latter necessitates roadbuilding and rail expansion as well.

¹⁸ Campbell, Charlie. "What Would Korean Reunification Look Like? Five Glaring Problems to Overcome." *Time*. 26 April 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <http://time.com/5255381/north-south-korea-kim-jong-un-reunification/>

¹⁹ Lind, Jennifer. "The Perils of Korean Unification." *The Diplomat*. 23 February 2015. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-perils-of-korean-unification/>

²⁰ Kim, Eunim. "Korea Unification Tax Proposal." *Junotane*. 1 January 2011. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20110713125012/http://www.junotane.com/analytical-updates/korea-unification-tax-proposal.html>

²¹ Lambert, Anthony. "Opening up North Korea's railways – could the world's longest train journey be getting an extension?" *The Telegraph*. 1 June 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/rail-journeys/north-korea-rail-travel/>

²² "Kim Jong-il Rolls Into Russia." *BBC News World Edition*. 20 August 2002. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2204146.stm>

Social

Decades of division have caused distinct national identities to emerge, and North Korea's reliance on censorship and propaganda have further reinforced the social divide between the Koreas. The people of each state are mostly unfamiliar with the other's language, culture, tradition, and overall way of life. However, there have been some efforts to bridging this vast divide: the April 2018 South Korean K-pop concert held in North Korea and the marching of Korean athletes under a unified flag during the opening ceremonies of the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics are notable instances.²³ Despite this, the problems of social integration persist—North Korean defectors have historically faced incredible difficulty in assimilating. Education, military service (South Korea's 2 years of mandatory service versus North Korea's 10+), work norms, and foreign exposure pose real obstacles to reunification.²⁴ Massive affirmative action and social programs must be established to ensure that North Korean citizens have the same skills and opportunities. This might be mitigated through the confederation system, in preserving existing social structures and divisions. Nonetheless, North Koreans are going to travel, live, and work in South Korea, and granting them the same social opportunities is a necessity. Delegates should be careful, however; too much support for North Korean citizens may breed resentment and stigma within the South Korea. Furthermore, it appears that family ties are an important element in reunification; numerous families were separated in the 20th century, and reuniting them may serve as a powerful incentive for reunification. For instance, Moon Jae-in, South Korea's 19th President, was born to North Korean refugees that reportedly long to reunite with their families.²⁵ Furthermore, support for reunification is dropping generationally: 80% of the South Korean population felt unification was necessary in the 1990s, compared to 56% in 2011.²⁶ Younger populations seem to embrace the division as more permanent, as the memory of Korea's unified history fades. Thus, delegates should understand reunification is time sensitive; it is imperative to act now or forever keep Korea in pieces.

²³ Ramzy, Austin. "What a Korean War Peace Deal Could Mean." *The New York Times*. 26 February 2019. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/world/asia/korea-peace-deal.html>

²⁴ Campbell, Charlie. "What Would Korean Reunification Look Like? Five Glaring Problems to Overcome." *Time*. 26 April 2018. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <http://time.com/5255381/north-south-korea-kim-jong-un-reunification/>

²⁵ Sit, Jane and Hancocks, Paula. "From North Korean refugee parents to the Blue House: meet South Korean president Moon Jae-in." CNN. 28 September 2017. Accessed 12 March 2019, from <https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/28/asia/moon-talk-asia/index.html>

²⁶ Harlan, Chico. "South Korean Youth Grow Wary of Unification." *The Washington Post*. 17 October 2011. Accessed 12 March 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korean-youth-grow-wary-of-unification/2011/10/14/qlQA3ujmqL_story.html?utm_term=.0df51f18069

Characters

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

The Republic of Korea, in 2025, is led by the Democratic Party of Korea, both in the executive branch and the legislative branch. Park Won-soon, the former Mayor of Seoul, is the current President of the Republic of Korea.

Lee Jae-yong, Chairman of Samsung

Lee was the Vice Chairman of Samsung. In 2021, he was officially put in charge as the Chairman of Samsung after the death of his father Lee Kun-hee. Lee was previously charged under corruption allegations after a political scandal has erupted in Korea in 2016.²⁷ The charges were made under assumptions and evidence that Lee and his family bribed the Park government to gain government contracts and economic support. The charges were laid off in 2018.²⁸ Lee later visited North Korea in September.²⁹ His position as the Chairman of Samsung is under threat from his siblings and his father's siblings alongside CEOs of subsidiary companies of Samsung.

As the Chairman of Samsung, you are the richest man in South Korea, owning the biggest conglomerate company in Korea. Samsung is currently the 4th largest company in the world and has massive economic, political, and diplomatic power.³⁰ With wealth, you will attempt to create investment plans in the DPRK after unification. The cheap workforce and resources are surely tempting entities all corporations desire. You will seize the opportunity and create Samsung businesses in the DPRK by promising the government jobs. Additionally, North Korea has an untapped mineral base that Samsung may have an interest in. You can consider expanding the existing Kaesong Industrial Complex or construct Samsung factories in Wonsan and Rason Special Economic Zone—however, these will be expensive investments.³¹

You have connections to almost all political parties in Korea, corporations, and foreign governments. With these connections, you will find support when in need.

²⁷ Kang, Taehwa. "재계와 접촉 강화하는 文...이재용, 현 정부서 첫 청와대행." JoongAng Daily. January 14, 2019. Accessed March 3, 2019. <https://news.joins.com/article/23288698>.

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ Raegwon, Kwak. "삼성 브랜드 가치 100조... 세계 4위." 조선닷컴 - 국제. February 3, 2018. Accessed March 13, 2019. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/02/03/2018020300054.html.

³¹ Ren, Shuli. "Kim Could Make North Korea Samsung's New Backyard." Bloomberg.com. May 13, 2018. Accessed March 3, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-13/kim-could-make-north-korea-samsung-s-new-backyard>.

Hyun Jeong-eun, Chairwoman of Hyundai Group

Hyun was the wife of the former chairman of Hyundai Group, Chung Mong-hun. In 2003, Chung committed suicide after allegations were made by the Conservatives that Chung bribed the DPRK officials into meeting with then President of South Korea, Kim Dae-Jung, in the “cash-for-summit scandal”.³² After Chung’s death, Hyundai Group dissolved throughout the years and the current “Hyundai group” includes the smaller divisions of Hyundai such as Hyundai elevator.³³

As the Chairwoman of Hyundai Group, you are desperate to rise back to the Golden Age of Hyundai. Although the current Hyundai Group may seem small, the company also has Hyundai Asan as one of its divisions. Hyundai Asan is a North Korea-specialized company. You will try your hardest to attract investors for Hyundai Asan and eventually merge with the previously separated “Hyundai Motor Group”, “Hyundai Department Store”, “Hyundai Heavy Industries”, and other former companies that were under the name of “Hyundai Group”.

To restore the glory Hyundai, you will need to create investment plans in the DPRK while attracting worldwide investors. Seize the cheap labour cost and resources to expand your company’s wealth. You can re-establish the long-forgotten Kumgang Mountain Tour to start your business in the tourism sector or expand the Kaesong Industrial Complex to amass wealth from cheap workforce products.³⁴

As Hyun, you are personally connected to the Liberal Korea Party since your maternal uncle is one of the strongest politicians within the LKP.³⁵ You can use this connection to move political decisions in your favour. You also have a relatively friendly relationship with some DPRK officials from previous businesses you had in the DPRK such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex or the Kumgang Mountain Tour.

³² "Asia-Pacific | S Koreans Charged over Summit Cash." BBC News. June 25, 2003. Accessed March 1, 2019. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3018874.stm>.

³³ Bloomberg.com. Accessed March 2, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/HYUZ:KS-hyundai-group>.

³⁴ "Billionaire Hyun Jeong-eun Hopes for Resumption of N. Korea Tours." Bilyonaryo. August 03, 2018. Accessed March 3, 2019. <https://www.bilyonaryo.com.ph/2018/08/03/billionaire-hyun-jeong-eun-hopes-for-resumption-of-n-korea-tours/>.

³⁵ Herald. "[Super Rich] Hyun Jeong-eun's Struggles Continue." The Korea Herald. March 01, 2016. Accessed March 3, 2019. <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160301000347>.

Choi Jeong-woo, Chairman of POSCO (Pohang Iron & Steel Company)

POSCO is the largest steel manufacturing company in South Korea, a nation that is the 6th largest producer of steel in the world.³⁶ Steel is also one of the largest exports of South Korea and is an industry the Korean government hopes to expand. During the Trump Presidency, the company did see some darker days with the steel tariffs greatly affecting their competitiveness in the global market.³⁷ However, the Klobuchar administration has since lifted steel tariffs.

Choi is the 9th Chairman of POSCO since 2018.³⁸ The longevity of his term as the chairman has surprised many since the holder of the position changed every time a new administration came into power in the RoK. Unlike his predecessor, who was an engineer, Choi graduated Pusan National University majoring in Economics and stayed politically neutral in the public.³⁹

As Choi, you will use the power as the biggest steel manufacturing company in the RoK to monopolize the iron resources in the DPRK and merge with the Chollima Steel Complex in the DPRK.⁴⁰ By doing so, POSCO will have access to one of the cheapest iron reserves in the world. You will also have access to relatively cheaper workforce, allowing your company to build steel mills in the DPRK rapidly.

POSCO has a relatively positive connection with the administration since the Korean government stood for POSCO when repealing the U.S. steel tariff. In return, POSCO benefits the rural area's economy by employing thousands of labourers in Gyeongsangbuk-do. POSCO is hostile towards the U.S. Republicans due to Trump's steel tariff and friendly with the U.S. Democrats because of the repeal.

³⁶ "Top 10 Largest Steel Producing Countries in the World." Steel. Accessed March 3, 2019. <https://www.steel-technology.com/articles/top-largest-steel-producing-countries-in-the-world>.

³⁷ "트럼프, 전세계 무역전쟁 포문... 한국 철강, 최악 피했지만 타격." 한겨레. March 02, 2018. Accessed March 1, 2019. <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/marketing/834419.html>.

³⁸ "Posco Picks Manager over Engineer for CEO." Korea JoongAng Daily. Accessed March 5, 2019. <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3049742>.

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ "North Korea's Chollima Steel Complex: Flames, Smoke and a Shower of Sparks Erupt | Pictures | Pics." Express.co.uk. July 26, 2017. Accessed March 1, 2019. <https://www.express.co.uk/pictures/pics/14365/Pyongyang-Chollima-Steel-Complex-North-Korea-Pictures>.

Yoo Seong-min, Leader of the Liberal Korea Party

Yoo was the Leader of the Bareunmirae Party, a centre-right, socially conservative, economically liberal party. He joined the LKP after deciding that the Bareunmirae Party will eventually be united with the LKP.⁴¹ Yoo won the leadership election in 2023 and remained ever since. He was elected by promising the “Second Miracle on the Han River”. The naming of the policy caused older generations to be attracted to Yoo, as the “Miracle on the Han River” was a policy named by Park Chung-hee, the former dictator of RoK.⁴² Yoo is also popular among the young conservatives for his promise of equal opportunity for all youths in the workplaces rather than giving benefits to the minorities, a policy the DPK initiated.⁴³ The Second Miracle on the Han River promises to privatize the Korean Electric Power Corporation, the Korean Gas Corporation, and the Korean Water Resources Corporation. The proposed policy is widely criticized by the 4 other major parties and within the party. The Second Miracle on the Han river also promises to construct the Taean-Pohang Highway and Haenam-Jeju Bridge. The policy focuses on government intervention in creating public infrastructure plans while privatizing public governmental companies.

As Yoo, your aims are to support the unification of Korea, but simultaneously balance the current government’s and ruling party's plan for unification. You should also ensure that the RoK ministers and the DPK party leader do not favour the DPRK agenda over the interest of the RoK citizens. The peace treaty and plans for the unification process should be acceptable for the National Assembly of Korea and satisfy $\frac{2}{3}$ of the representatives in the house. During the talks, you will have to represent the citizens who prefer a slow stable unification process. By making yourself look like the stronger political leader than the leader of the DPK, you will be able to win the upcoming local and presidential election.

The LKP is currently in control of around $\frac{1}{3}$ of the National Assembly, making them the largest opposition party in the house. The LKP is close to most Korean chaebols, Korean conglomerates, because of their business-friendly policies. The LKP is also friendly with the US Republicans and Japanese conservatives.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Denney, Steven. "South Korean Conservatives: What Now?" The Diplomat. February 28, 2019. Accessed March 4, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/south-korean-conservatives-what-now/>.

⁴² "The Korean Economy – the Miracle on the Hangang River." KOREA.net Gateway to Korea. Accessed March 6, 2019. <http://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Economy/The-Miracle-on-The-Hangang>.

⁴³ Kookmin Ilbo. “젊은 보수 확인한 유승민... 홍준표 따돌린 2030 유권자 지지율”. Kookmin Ilbo. May 10, 2017. Accessed March 5, 2019. <http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0011455866>

⁴⁴ Yoon, Hyungjong. "자유한국당 대선후보 홍준표 '친재벌'반노조." 한겨레. March 31, 2017. Accessed March 7, 2019. <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/assembly/788889.html>.

Lee Nak-yeon, Leader of the Democratic Party of Korea

Lee was the Prime Minister of RoK under the Moon administration. He was highly praised for his diplomatic attitude towards the opposition and was later elected the Leader of the DPK.⁴⁵ Despite Lee's diplomatic attitude and leadership qualities, the party's approval rating is falling. Lee is now desperate to gather support from the youth, who are greatly affected by the economic downturn. The current DPK President of RoK is Park Won-soon, but the constant failure in economic policy has led Lee to distance the party from the government. The party desperately needs a stable economic plan to restore the economic growth and minimize the damage of unification.

As Lee, your aims are to support unification while balancing the government and the opposition party's unification agenda. You don't want a slowed down unification process, but also want the short-term economic damage caused by the unification minimized. You will also ensure that the peace treaty is acceptable for your party members and other representatives in the National Assembly. Lastly, your aim is to make sure that the LKP does not attempt to favour the US and Japanese agenda.

The DPK is the biggest liberal party in Korea with its policies attracting most of leftists and centrists. The DPK also has the largest amount of representatives in the National Assembly. Your party is close to Samsung. Your party also has external ties with US Democrats, the DPRK, and the Japanese liberals.

Kim Woo-sang, Minister of Unification

Kim used to teach International Relations and Global Security at Yonsei University until President Park Won-soon offered him this position.

As Kim, your aims are to lead conversations regarding unification plans solely involving the DPRK and the RoK. You will plan further Inter-Korea dialogues and Economic Cooperation. You also will plan humanitarian support from the ROK for citizens in the DPRK. Educating on the benefits and risks of unification is also your job, alongside discussing the future of DPRK nationals in RoK. Lastly, you will have to match South Korean citizens with their separated families in the DPRK and vice versa.

⁴⁶

As the Minister of Unification, you have the power to organize and control DPRK related businesses, governmental or private. You also have the power to request meetings with high officials in the DPRK.

⁴⁵ Lee, Jaejin. "차기 대선주자 1위 이낙연 총리, 인기요인 뭐길래." 미디어오늘. November 02, 2018. Accessed March 4, 2019. <http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/?mod=news&act=articleView&idxno=145314>.

⁴⁶ "Ministry of Unification." Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation. Accessed March 3, 2019. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/cooperation/.

Cho Tae-yul, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Cho used to head the Permanent Mission of the RoK to the United Nations under the Moon administration, making him very skilled in diplomacy through connections with diplomats and other nations.

As Cho, your aims are to discuss and plan solutions to the North Korean nuclear weapon disarmament process, the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, future foreign policy, economic agreements after unification, and the future status of North Korean nationals outside Korea after unification.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, you have the power to manage diplomatic actions led by, or involving, the RoK by sending delegations to international conferences and NGO conferences. You can also negotiate, and interpret any diplomatic deals South Korea is involved in. Lastly, you have responsibility of Korean nationals outside the RoK.

Park Han-Ki, Minister of National Defense

Park used to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff & Chief Director of the Joint Defense Headquarters, managing most of the RoK military.

As Park your aims are to discuss the fate of artilleries, missile systems, military bases, military facilities stationed near the DMZ, plan to unite armies, distribute military equipments, and plan military development and research. You will have to discuss the fate of the US army in RoK with the US delegation. You will then have to discuss the fate of cooperative military training with the US and Japan, and the fate of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) with the whole committee.⁴⁷

As the Minister of National Defense, you are second-in-command to the President when commanding all military staffs for military operations and training.

⁴⁷ Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea. Defense Policy, Republic of Korea. Accessed March 2, 2019. <http://www.mnd.go.kr/mbs/home/mbs/mndEN/>

Park Sun-ho, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport

Park used to be the 1st Vice Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport making him experienced in creating plans for the maintenance and development of land, infrastructure, and transport.

As Park, your aims are to modernize the infrastructure in the DPRK, meeting safety standards in the RoK, and house North Koreans. The construction of the government-funded houses will hopefully lower the homeless rates in the DPRK while helping the flow of skilled RoK citizens to the DPRK. You will also keep the current DPRK-PRC-Russian border after unification and discuss the fate of the Liancourt Rocks. You will improve the transportation system in the DPRK, connect the railways from Russia to RoK through DPRK, and renovate infrastructure in the DPRK.

As the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, you have the power to plan public infrastructure plans in RoK, approve or deny private infrastructure plans in RoK, maintain the private and public ownership of land, and investigate any undeveloped natural resources reserves for potential improvement.⁴⁸

Noh Hyeong-ouk, Minister of Economy and Finance

Noh used to be the Minister of Office for Government Policy Coordination making him very knowledgeable in creating workable government policies.

As Noh, your aims are to come up with an economic system that will minimize the damage caused by the unification through taxation policies, public fundings of infrastructure development plans in the DPRK, funding of welfare programs, and attract foreign investments in private businesses.

As the Minister of Economy and Finance, you have the power to manage the tax rates in the RoK, the minimum wage, and propose fundings plans essential to funding government's policies to the National Assembly.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Republic Of Korea. Sectoral Policies, Republic of Korea. Accessed March 3, 2019. http://www.molit.go.kr/english/USR/sectoral/m_29477/1st.jsp?STATE=T

⁴⁹ Ministry of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea. Economic Policy, Republic of Korea, Accessed March 5, 2019. <http://english.moef.go.kr/ec/selectTbEconomicList.do?boardCd=E0005>

Chu Jang-min, Minister of Environment

Chu used to be the Vice President of the Korea Environment Institute, making him knowledgeable in the environment of Korea.

As Chu, your aims are to establish new natural parks in the DPRK, investigate the current status of environment, stop rapid destruction of nature, investigate the environment near the nuclear tests, and advocate for sustainable growth.

As the Minister of Environment you manage national parks and wildlife preservation zones in the RoK, control carbon emissions according to international agreements, and research potential damages of business on the environment.⁵⁰

Kim Chung-sook, Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism

Kim used to teach Korean Language and Literature at Korea University, making her knowledgeable in the Korean culture and language.

As Kim, your task is to reduce the cultural and linguistic differences between RoK and the DPRK, unite training centres, promote KPOP and other South Korean cultures in the DPRK, promote DPRK tourism, distribute the United Korean passports, and unite all international transportation systems' security procedures.

As the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, you promote Korean culture, discuss sporting events involving Korean athletes, fund national sports organizations, promote Korean tourism, and set the proper use of the Korean language.⁵¹

Kim Yang-soo, Minister of Oceans and Fisheries

Kim used to be the Vice Minister of Oceans and Fisheries, making him knowledgeable in oceanic affairs.

As Kim, your aims are the renegotiate the maritime border between the Korean Peninsula, China, Japan, and Russia, destroy the fishing agreement the DPRK had with the PRC, discuss the Liancourt Rocks conflict, discuss the issue of illegal Chinese fishers entering South Korean maritime borders, plan a sustainable fishing method, and investigate the potential development of gas hydrate reserves near Busan.

As the Minister of Oceans and Fisheries, you control fisheries-related plans and investigation occurring within the Korean maritime borders.⁵²

⁵⁰ Ministry of Environment, Republic Of Korea. Major Policies, Republic of Korea. Accessed March 3, 2019. <http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/index.do?menuId=201>

⁵¹ 문화체육관광부, 대한민국. 주요정책, 대한민국. Accessed March 3, 2019. https://www.mcst.go.kr/kor/s_policy/plan2019/plan2019.jsp

⁵² Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Republic of Korea. Mission & Vision, Republic of Korea. Accessed March 2, 2019. <http://www.mof.go.kr/eng/content/view.do?menuKey=752&contentKey=32>

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is led by Kim Jong-un with his ministers, where refusing to comply with Kim's instruction will lead to execution.

Ri Chun-sam, Minister of State Natural Resources Development

Ri used to be the Vice Minister of Collection and Industry, making him knowledgeable in the development and usage of natural resources in the DPRK.

As Ri, your aims are to develop natural resources in the DPRK, distribute the mined resources to construct, produce, and export resources during the unification process, and unite North Korean natural resources development with South Korea.

As the Minister of State Natural Resources Development, you manage natural resources developed in the DPRK and set plans for potential development projects in newly discovered natural resources reserves.^{53 54}

Park Yong-il, Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland

Park used to be the Vice Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, making him experienced in the process the unification.

As Park, your aims are to promote unification and peace talks between the two Koreas while ensuring that the DPRK interests are protected. You will also have to investigate and match South Korean citizens with their separated families in the DPRK and vice versa.

As the Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, you can request meetings with high officials in the RoK and have access to anti-South Korean propaganda materials.^{55 56}

⁵³ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁵⁴ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁵⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁵⁶ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

Jang Hyok, Minister of Railways

Jang used to be the Vice Minister of Railways, making him an influential individual in the DPRK.

As Jang, your aims are to connect the DPRK railways, the Trans-Siberian Railways, and the RoK railways to ensure cheaper transportation of items being imported and exported through the Korean Peninsula, discuss the potential sites of renovation, and the cost of renovating old DPRK railways.

As the Minister of Railways, you plan new railways in the DPRK, control movements on the railways within the DPRK, and plan renovations.^{57 58}

Kim Kyoung-nam, Minister of Commerce

Kim used to be the Vice Director of the Social Sciences Research Institute for Unification, making him a friendly individual for negotiations with RoK delegates.

As Kim, your task is to normalize trade with the RoK and other formerly hostile countries and regulate tariffs.

As the Minister of Commerce, you have the power to regulate tariffs on products entering into the DPRK and negotiate trade deals with foreign nations.^{59 60}

Ri Yong-Ho, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ri used to be the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, attending many conferences with the RoK officials, making him cognizant of the RoK agenda.

As Ri, your aims are to normalize diplomatic relations with other nations, unite the diplomatic stance on global issues with the RoK, plan the exchange of the remains of the soldiers, and discuss the future of DPRK nationals in the RoK, the PRC, the Russian Federation, the U.S., and Japan.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, you have the power to send delegations to international bodies and conferences to represent the DPRK's interest and negotiate with other nations.^{61 62}

⁵⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁵⁸ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁶⁰ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁶¹ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁶² 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

Song Chun-sop, Minister of Fisheries

Song used to be the Vice Minister of Fisheries.

As Song, your aims are to normalize the autonomy of the DPRK maritime border with the PRC, ensure a high quality of life for fishermen, and investigate the status of DPRK marine life prior to the unification.

As the Minister of Fisheries, you control activities that occur within the maritime borders of the DPRK and protect the quality of life of fishermen. Fisheries is one of the biggest domestic industries within the DPRK, creating jobs for a majority of the DPRK citizens living in coastal cities.^{63 64}

Mun Myong-hak, Minister of Coal Industry

Mun used to be the Director of the Sunchon District Mining Complex, allowing him to truly represent the mining industry in the DPRK.

As Mun, your task is to ensure the exportation of coals to the world, ensure the quality of life of coal mine workers, and search for additional coal mining sites with South Korean scientists.

As the Minister of Coal Industry, you control mining sites within the DPRK and manage and export all coal. Coal is one of the largest exported goods of the DPRK.^{65 66}

Ki Kwang-ho, Minister of Finance

Ki used to be the Vice Minister of Finance.

As Ki, your aims are to create a working expense plan by cooperating with the RoK Minister of Economy and Finance, create a new taxation policy according to the current income rates of DPRK citizens, reduce the income inequalities between RoK citizens and DPRK citizens, calculate the estimated cost of unification, and delegate payment of said cost.

As the Minister of Finance, you have the power to create a budget plan for government spending, set sales tax, and set income tax on citizens.^{67 68}

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁶⁴ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁶⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁶⁶ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁶⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁶⁸ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

Park Hoon, Minister of Construction and Building-Materials Industries

Park used to be the Vice Secretary General of the Cabinet Secretariat.

As Park, your task is to gain building materials from the RoK in order to support efforts to renovate and construct new infrastructures in the DPRK and redistribute building materials of the DPRK and the RoK for an efficient construction process.

As the Minister of Construction and Building-Materials Industries, you can distribute the building materials around the country and order construction plans.^{69 70}

Park Chun-nam, Minister of Culture

Park used to be the Vice Minister of Culture.

As Park, your aims are to ensure the protection of North Korean culture, language, and dialect after the unification and promote North Korea tourism.

As the Minister of Culture, you have the power to control broadcasts within the DPRK, organize fine arts education, international sporting, and control the tourism industry.^{71 72}

Kang Jong-gwan, Minister of Land and Maritime Transport

Kang used to be the Director of Harbour and Transportation Bureau.

As Kang, your aims will be to ensure the continuation and expansion of both marine and land transport of goods and people after unification.

As the Minister of Land and Maritime Transport, you have the power to manage all transported goods and people within the DPRK.^{73 74}

⁶⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁷⁰ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁷¹ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁷² 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁷³ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁷⁴ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

Han Ryong-guk, Minister of Forestry

Han's background is unknown.

As Han your task is to create plans to protect the wildlife in the DMZ, investigate the current status of rivers, lakes, mountains, forests in the DPRK, stop rapid construction of infrastructure in the DPRK, investigate the environment near the nuclear test zones in the DPRK, and create plans for environment-friendly sustainable growth.

As the Minister of Forestry you manage national parks and wildlife preservation zones in the DPRK, and protect wildlife from mass destruction caused by overhunting or excessive logging.^{75 76}

No Kwang-chol, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

No used to be the Minister of People's Armed Forces, equivalent to the Minister of Defense.

As No, your aims are to discuss the fate of artilleries, missile system, military bases, etc. stationed near the DMZ, discuss the fate of the US army in RoK, plan to unite armies, share and distribute military equipment, discuss the future plans for military development and research, discuss the fate of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense).

As the Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, you are second-in-command to Kim Jong-un in controlling the entirety of the DPRK military.^{77 78}

⁷⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁷⁶ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

⁷⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/KN.html>.

⁷⁸ 북한정보포털 | 인물. Accessed March 8, 2019. <http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/theme/peopleList.do>.

United States of America

The US is led by Amy Klobuchar, a Democrat after the 2024 Presidential Election. The House of Representatives and the Senate have a Democrat majority.

Samantha Power, US Secretary of State

Mrs. Power was the 28th United States Ambassador to the United Nations under the Obama administration.⁷⁹

As Power, your task is to normalize relations with the DPRK, ensure international aid is used for appropriate purposes, attract the Unified Korea into the American sphere of influence, lift embargos on the DPRK government, discuss the North Korean nuclear weapon disarmament process, investigate nuclear testing sites, discuss the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, and receive the remains of US soldiers from the Korean War.

As the Secretary of State, you manage diplomatic actions led by or involving the United States, negotiate and interpret diplomatic deals the US is involved in, and discuss the future of DPRK nationals in the U.S.⁸⁰

Sung Kim, Secretary of Commerce

Kim used to be the United States Ambassador to South Korea, United States Special Representative for North Korea Policy, and the United States Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, making him very knowledgeable regarding negotiations with Korean officials.⁸¹

As Kim, your task is to promote American businesses to create jobs in the DPRK, ensure that the wealth of American investors is protected, and seek opportunity in cheaper labour forces and natural resources available in North Korea.

As the Secretary of Commerce, you promote American businesses' interests in foreign countries, protect American investors' wealth outside the nation, and contribute in signing FTAs and other economic agreements.⁸²

⁷⁹ "Samantha Power." Forbes. Accessed March 8, 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/profile/samantha-power/#58c14c86e88f>.

⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.state.gov/whatwedo/>.

⁸¹ Zwirko, Colin. "Who Is Sung Kim, the American Diplomat Leading Talks with the North Koreans?" NK News - North Korea News. May 30, 2018. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.nknews.org/2018/05/who-is-sung-kim-the-american-diplomat-leading-talks-with-the-north-koreans/>.

⁸² "About Commerce." U.S. Department of Commerce. October 31, 2018. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.commerce.gov/about>.

Vincent K. Brooks, Secretary of Defense

Mr. Brooks used to be the Commander of United States Forces Korea, Commander of the United Nations Command, and the Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, making him knowledgeable regarding the military situation on the Korean Peninsula.⁸³

As Brooks, your aims are to discuss the fate of the US army in RoK, discuss the future plans for military development and research with Unified Korea, identify the remains of the US soldiers currently in the DPRK, discuss potential plans of deploying US troops in the DPRK after unification, potential plans for constructing US army bases, and potential plans of installing radar in the DPRK. Finally, you should discuss the future of THAAD.

As the Secretary of Defense, you are second-in-line to command the US Army and can contribute in making policies related to diplomacy.⁸⁴

Jay Lefkowitz, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development

Mr. Lefkowitz used to be the United States Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues under the Bush Administration.

As Lefkowitz, your task is to organize a funding project to fund the RoK and the DPRK to assist poverty issues in the DPRK, the funding of potential green energy businesses, and technical training of DPRK citizens. You will also be able to fund and negotiate with international NGOs to provide private specialists for medical assistance and skills necessary to be employed in a high-income job. You can use the Economic Support Funds to attract Unified Korea to the U.S. influence by providing economic assistance directly to the RoK and the DPRK governments.

As the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, you have the ability to create a technical assistance plan for countries in need. You also have the power to negotiate and fund NGOs to assist nations.⁸⁵

⁸³ "Brooks Steps Down in South Korea." Association of the United States Army. November 14, 2018. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.ausea.org/news/brooks-steps-down-south-korea>.

⁸⁴ "Acting Secretary of Defense." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.defense.gov/Our-Story/Meet-the-Team/Acting-Secretary-of-Defense/>.

⁸⁵ "What We Do." U.S. Agency for International Development. February 16, 2018. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do>.

People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China has been led by Xi Jinping since 2012. The Chinese legislative branch consists of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the National People's Congress.

Liu Jieyi, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Liu used to be the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations and the director of the Taiwan Affairs Office.

As Liu, your aims are to strengthen the alliance of PRC and the Unified Korea, ensure international aid to be used for appropriate purposes, attract the Unified Korea into Chinese sphere of influence, lift embargoes on the DPRK, discuss the North Korean nuclear weapon disarmament process, investigate the nuclear testing sites and the disarmament process, discuss the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, discuss the future of Chinese nationals in the DPRK, and extend the Belt and Road Initiative to the Korean Peninsula.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, you have the power to manage diplomatic actions led by or involving the People's Republic of China, send delegations to international conferences and NGO conferences, and negotiate and interpret, any diplomatic deals China is involved in.⁸⁶

Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission

Zhang used to be the Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission.

As Zhang, your task is to discuss the fate of the US army in RoK, potential Chinese military bases in Unified Korea, future plans for military development, discuss potential plans of deploying Chinese troops in the DPRK, installing radar, discuss the future of THAAD, and extend the Belt and Road Initiative to the Korean Peninsula.

As the Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission, you are the second-in-line to commanding the People's Liberation Army and have the power to contribute to making policies related to diplomacy.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Main Functions. Accessed March 9, 2019. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjw_663304/zyzz_663306/.

⁸⁷ Central Military Commission. Accessed March 9, 2019. <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/cmcc/index.htm>.

Fu Ziying, Minister of Commerce

Fu used to be the International Trade Representative of China.

As Fu, your aims are to promote Chinese businesses to create jobs in the DPRK, protect Chinese businesses already related to the DPRK and the RoK, ensure that the wealth of Chinese investors is protected, seek opportunity in cheaper labour forces and natural resources, and extend the Belt and Road Initiative to the Korean Peninsula.

As the Minister of Commerce, you promote Chinese business' interest in foreign countries, protect Chinese investors' wealth outside the nation, and contribute to FTAs and other economic agreements.⁸⁸

Wang Wentao, Minister of Transport

Wang used to be the Governor of Heilongjiang Province.

As Wang, your aims are to renovate all routes (Air, land, and marine routes) that connect PRC with the DPRK, connect the DPRK railways with the Chinese railways from Dandong, Changdian, Ji'an, Yanji, and Hunchun to ensure cheaper transportation of imports and exports, and expand airline routes and marine trade routes between the PRC and the DPRK.

As the Minister of Transport, you have the power to manage railway, road, marine, and air transportation of any sort, transporting goods or people within China or routes connected to China.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Topics. Accessed March 9, 2019. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_20130329//index.shtml.

⁸⁹ Ministry of Transport of the People's Republic of China. Accessed March 9, 2019. http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/content_281474986284076.htm.

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation is led by Sergey Shoygu from the United Russia. Shoygu was the Minister of Defence under Vladimir Putin. The United Russia has the majority in the State Duma.

Oleg Kozhemyako, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East

Kozhemyako used to be the Governor of Primorsky Krai, a province near the Chinese and North Korean border.

As Kozhemyako, your task is to connect the DPRK railways, Trans-Siberian Railways, and the RoK railways to ensure cheaper transportation of imports and exports through the Korean Peninsula, seek the economic and social boom of Russian villages near the North Korean border, and promote marine trade routes involving Vladivostok.

As the Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East, you manage economic and social activities that occur in the Russian Far East and propose potential projects that will boost the economy and the social scene of the Russian Far East.⁹⁰

Vasily Nebenzya, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Nebenzya used to be the Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN.

As Nebenzya, your task will be to strengthen the alliance of Russia and the Unified Korea, ensure international aid be used for appropriate purposes, lift embargoes, discuss the North Korean nuclear weapon disarmament process, investigate the nuclear testing sites and the disarmament process, discuss the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, discuss the future of Russian nationals in the DPRK, and promote positive economic relationship between the Unified Korea and the Russia.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, you manage diplomatic actions led by or involving the Russian Federation, send delegations to international conferences and NGO conferences, and negotiate and interpret diplomatic deals Russia is involved in.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East - The Russian Government. Accessed March 9, 2019. <http://government.ru/en/department/239/events/>.

⁹¹ Home. Accessed March 9, 2019. http://www.mid.ru/en_GB/main_en.

Valery Gerasimov, Minister of Defence

Gerasimov used to be the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and the First Deputy Defence Minister of Russia.

As Gerasimov, your aims are to discuss the future plans for military development and research with Unified Korea, possible construction of naval bases or airfields in Rason, North Korea, and the future of THAAD.

As the Minister of Defence, you are second-in-line to command the Russian Army and can contribute to making policies related to diplomacy.⁹²

Japan

Japan is currently led by Seiko Noda from the Liberal Democratic Party. Noda used to be the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications under the Abe Government. She is one of the moderate conservatives in the party and holds an orthodox view on WW2 history.

Akira Amari, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Amari is the Member of the House of Representatives representing the Liberal Democratic Party. He is one of the more moderate conservatives in the party and holds orthodox views on WW2 history.⁹³

As Amari, your task is to discuss the future of DPRK nationals in Japan, strengthen the alliance of Japan and the Unified Korea, ensure international aid to be used for appropriate purposes, lift embargoes, discuss the North Korean nuclear weapon disarmament process, contribute in sending in NGO researchers to investigate the nuclear testing sites and the disarmament process, discuss the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, promote positive economic relationships between the Unified Korea and Japan, and ensure the strength of the US-Japanese Alliance.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, you manage diplomatic actions led by or involving Japan, send delegations to international conferences and NGO conferences, and negotiate and interpret diplomatic deals Japan is involved in.⁹⁴

⁹² "Military Districts." Home : Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Accessed March 9, 2019. <http://eng.mil.ru/>.

⁹³ "AMARI Akira." AMARI Akira | Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.jimin.jp/english/profile/members/114615.html>.

⁹⁴ "Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Accessed March 8, 2019. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/index.html>.

Kenya Akiba, Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry

Akiba is the Member of the House of Representatives representing the Liberal Democratic Party. He is one of the more moderate conservatives in the party and holds orthodox views on WW2 history.⁹⁵

As Akiba, your aims are to convince Japanese businesses to create jobs in the DPRK, ensure that the wealth of Japanese investors is protected, and seek opportunity in cheaper labour forces and natural resources available in North Korea.

As the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, you promote Japanese business' interest in foreign countries, protect Japanese investors' wealth outside the nation, and contribute to FTAs and other economic agreements.⁹⁶

Tsukasa Akimoto, Minister of Defense

Akimoto is a member of the House of Representatives and is one of the alt-right politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party and holds a revisionist view on WW2 history.⁹⁷

As Akimoto, your task is to discuss the fate of the US army in RoK, cooperative military training with the US and Japan, future plans for military development and research a, search and identify the remains of Japanese soldiers from the First Sino-Japanese War, discuss the future of THAAD, and preserve peace and authority within Japan from internal and external enemies.

As the Minister of Defense, you are second-in-line to commanding the Japan Self-Defense Forces and can contribute to making policies related to diplomacy.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ "AKIBA Kenya." AKIBA Kenya | Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Accessed March 8, 2019. <https://www.jimin.jp/english/profile/members/114614.html>.

⁹⁶ "Policies." Policies / METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Accessed March 7, 2019. http://www.meti.go.jp/english/index_policies.html.

⁹⁷ "AKIMOTO Tsukasa." AKIMOTO Tsukasa | Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Accessed March 8, 2019. <https://www.jimin.jp/english/profile/members/120794.html>.

⁹⁸ Japan Ministry of Defense. Accessed March 9, 2019. <https://www.mod.go.jp/e/>.

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- "AKIMOTO Tsukasa." AKIMOTO Tsukasa | Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Accessed March 8, 2019. <https://www.jimin.jp/english/profile/members/120794.html>.
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